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 Racial violence and the Brexit state 
Whatever else Brexit means or does not mean, it certainly means racism. Born of fortuitous 
circumstances, lacking programme or policy, the government has had to find its ‘mandate’ 
in the twin Brexit themes: that immigration is unravelling of the nation, and anything 
foreign, except investment, is abhorrent to its ethos – thus giving a fillip to popular racism 
and elevating institutional racism to fully-fledged state racism. 
Of course there were signs of state racism from the time of the first Immigration Act in 
1962, but these were counterbalanced by anti-discrimination legislation and community 
programmes – and for a while the way was opened to a truly multicultural society, the 
foremost in Europe, and its exemplar. The difference today is that racism and xenophobia 
have become tied into the state itself, making nativism the state ideology and ‘take back 
control’ its political culture. 
In the post-referendum period, racial violence and harassment, as this report graphically 
shows, became widespread and brazen. But in going along with the dominant narrative, 
the government reduced racial violence, a socially-based issue, to individualised ‘hate 
crime’. And in so siphoning off racism and racial violence to the terrain of law and order, 
the government conceals its complicity in creating state racism. 
The struggle then is on two levels, both at once: against state racism and against ‘hate 
crime’. 
A. Sivanandan 
The explosion of racist violence that followed the announcement of the EU referendum 
result on 24 June 2016 has been well documented. Though the political direction of travel 
in the UK on issues of immigration, race, religion and refugee policy has largely been 
disconnected from that violence, the sheer level of racist abuse and attacks could not be 
ignored. Home Secretary Amber Rudd, launching a hate crime strategy a few days after 
the referendum, declared that hate crimes were ‘utterly unacceptable’ and must be 
‘stamped out’. Former Prime Minister David Cameron described the situation as 
‘despicable’,1 whilst the new one, Theresa May, said that hate ‘has no place in the 
UK’.2 For Metropolitan Police Chief Bernard Hogan-Howe, the 2,300 (plus) racist 
incidents reported to the police in the thirty-eight days after the referendum, were a 
‘horrible spike’.3 
The Institute of Race Relations’ thesis is that the spike in race hatred has had a direct 
impetus from the divisive approach to race, religion and migration which is now official 
policy. To put it simply, if a hostile environment is embedded politically, why should we 
be surprised when it takes root culturally? What do hate crimes tell us about the culture of 
the country we are living in, and is it possible to trace a relationship between ‘hate’, media 
frameworks, government policy and institutional practices? These are the questions we 
seek to answer in our examination of post-referendum racial violence.4 
The legitimation of racial violence 
In the aftermath of the EU referendum, incidents of racist abuse began to be shared on 
social media almost immediately, with several online platforms being set up specifically to 
collate and document the extent. Long-established advocacy and campaigning 
organisations also noted sharp increases in the number of incidents being reported to them, 
as well as requests for support. A few weeks after the referendum, for example, The 
Monitoring Group brought hundreds of people together in London in order to ‘respond, 
address and move forward’ in a ‘hostile and racially charged Britain’.5 Meanwhile, the 
Bristol-based Stand Against Racism and Inequality (SARI) revealed that more people 
were approaching it for advice, and Just West Yorkshire later called for an audit of ‘race 
hate crime arrangements’ because of concerns about the response to violence and abuse in 
the region.6 The police, meanwhile, were producing regular statistics on hate crime, and 
there was an intense media focus on racist violence in the UK, with particularly brutal 
incidents receiving blanket coverage. 
 In the first four days after the referendum, 85 hate crimes were reported to True 
Vision – a police-funded online reporting mechanism – compared to 57 in the same 
period four weeks earlier. 
 In the seven days after the referendum, the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC), 
which runs the True Vision online reporting mechanism, received 331 allegations of 
hate crimes, compared with a weekly average of 63.7 
 In the fortnight after the result, British Transport Police (BTP) received 119 
allegations of racist abuse or violence taking place on British railways.8 
 Between 24 June and 2 July, 599 racist incidents were reported to Scotland Yard: an 
average of 67 per day, compared to 44 per day prior to the referendum.9 
 Between 16 June and 30 June, more than 3,000 hate crimes were reported to the 
police across the UK: a 42% increase on the same period in 2015.10 
Whilst the majority of the 134 incidents examined were incidents of racist abuse, they also 
included physical assaults, arson attacks, death threats and stabbings. Several people were 
hospitalised. Most of these incidents were in England; and whilst the most frequent 
‘targets’ were European migrants (particularly eastern European migrants) and Muslims, 
these were not the only people targeted. There were incidents against black people. Jewish 
people were targeted. People were singled out for attack on the basis of speaking a foreign 
language, or presumptions about their ‘right’ to be here. Children were amongst those who 
received abuse, sometimes travelling to or from school. 
Fifty-one of the incidents included references either explicitly to the EU referendum and 
its outcome, or the messages that it conveyed (such as ‘taking the country back’). And 
there has been a distinct intensification of particular forms of racist violence which link to 
it. 
1. The referendum result was taken by some as affirmation that the country was 
not only now ‘theirs’, but that it was theirs ‘again’. In this way, there was a sense 
of history being corrected and of historical wrongs (immigration, primarily) being 
righted. One person for example, who racially abused a woman in London, referred to 
‘this lot’ having lost the election, and that it was time for them to ‘go back’ out of ‘our 
country’. Another person was asked if he was from the EU and then told to ‘fuck off 
back to your country’ and to ‘get the fuck out of our country’. One person who was 
assaulted was chased by his attacker first, who also shouted ‘go back home you 
fucking immigrant’. 
2. The referendum was envisaged as a sign that a set of assumed legal and cultural 
‘norms’ could be reasserted. Thus, for example, in one incident a woman walking 
with her 9-year-old daughter was approached by a man who racially abused her, 
ripped off her niqab and reportedly told her ‘You’re in Britain, live by British rules’. 
In another, a threat of anti-Muslim violence was accompanied by the message that 
there is only ‘one law’ in the UK, and that the victim had to ‘abide by it’. An eastern 
European woman was reduced to tears by a man telling her to ‘Just go home. We 
voted you out. You will have to leave the country soon’. When she threatened to call 
the police, the man’s response was to tell her to call ‘whoever you want’ as this is ‘our 
country, our law’. What these and other incidents pointed to was the manner in which 
the referendum fostered a notion that a set of institutional norms, which had been 
subverted by the presence and management of ‘diversity’, could now be re-
established. 
3. The racist violence that was legitimised was underpinned by a racism tied to 
‘entitlement’. The racist abuse of one person mistakenly assumed to be a Polish 
national, who was told ‘we only tolerate you lot because of the income you bring in’, 
indicated a form of racism within which people were only accepted in the UK on the 
basis that they brought skills/capital. In another, a homeless migrant was deliberately 
picked out and assaulted, in part because he was homeless. Here was a very clear 
message: outsiders are acceptable only when profitable. 
4. Voting or visibly campaigning for the UK to remain in Europe was taken by 
some to be a form of betrayal. In a few isolated cases, people from BAME 
communities were targeted after the referendum result seemingly because they had 
actively campaigned prior to it. One locally prominent ‘Remain’ campaigner found 
that the windows of his business had been smashed; another activist was accosted and 
told to ‘get out the country’. 
5. Anti-migrant and anti-Muslim racism, in particular, intersected in the context of 
the EU referendum. The EU referendum, of course, did not create racism. Rather, 
the campaign drew on and fed into existing forms of racism, particularly 
Islamophobia, whilst underpinning forms of racism of its own. As our sample 
illustrates, the range of people targeted was broad, and in around two-thirds of the 
incidents, the victims were Muslims or eastern European migrants. This should not be 
surprising. For in the context of a referendum which in many ways became a proxy 
for a debate about who should or should not be in the UK, and if so under what 
conditions, anti-Muslim racism and anti-migrant racism intersected. In both cases, the 
targets have been portrayed routinely as societal antibodies. In both cases, they are 
regarded as undermining and irreversibly transforming the cultural and political basis 
of the nation. For Muslim communities the debate, over the last few years, about 
British values in the context of counter radicalisation measures, has led to a situation 
in which Muslims as a whole are presented as holding values antithetical to 
Britishness. 
6. The ‘newness’ of post-referendum racism is rooted in and sustained by the 
structural racism of ‘old’. There has been a significant upsurge of interest in racial 
violence after the referendum, with the implication that a previously ‘tolerant’ nation 
has been tipped over some precipice. But this is ahistorical. As we have emphasised 
elsewhere, the abuse that appeared to characterise much of the post-referendum 
racism that we have documented – ‘go home’, ‘taking our country back’ and so on – 
has historical echoes. The racism that has certainly intensified following the 
referendum is given legitimacy not just by the referendum itself, but by the forms of 
racism embedded as national policy in the decades leading up to it, for example in 
debates over immigrant numbers, media scares about scroungers, policies like Prevent 
which stigmatise whole communities. And in this context, it is indicative that certain 
messages previously belonging solely to the far Right are now found in dominant 
policy positions. 
7. The racial violence that has intensified following the referendum result is the 
fallout of policy. In the above context, the racist violence that has followed the 
referendum is not a just a ‘spike’, a ‘jump’ or a ‘spate’, as the mainstream consensus 
has it. It is the literal manifestation of the political climate which sustains it. As a 
report published by three groups set up after the referendum has suggested – 
istreetwatch, Worrying Signs and #postrefracism – the 645 racist incidents it collated 
on social media are indicative of the ‘increasing normalisation of xenoracist narratives 
and the manifestation of the “hostile environment principle”’.11 And the Commission 
for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has warned that UK counter-
terrorism policy has ‘created an atmosphere of suspicion towards members of Muslim 
communities’.12 And this comes on the back of repeated criticisms, including a 
statement from the independent reviewer of terrorism laws that the Prevent strategy 
causes ‘mistrust’.13 
We would go further. Almost every utterance shouted alongside a specific racist 
attack, is already a dominant ideological policy position. In other words, much of the 
racist abuse that has followed the referendum result has had its gestation within policy 
measures which express the same aim. There is a parallel, of course, between the 
‘leave’ campaign’s unofficial slogan of ‘taking the country back’ and the racist abuse 
that urges the same. But there is also a parallel between the racist assault of a 
homeless migrant, who is not deemed to be economically productive, and the public 
spectacle of the police, immigration authorities and other agencies rounding up 
homeless migrants and ‘removing’ them for the same reason. Likewise, there is a 
parallel between a racist violence that is practically carried out as some perverse form 
of public duty and state policies which place legal demands on a variety of agencies to 
racially profile ‘service-users’, and track down irregular migrants. And there is a 
parallel, too, between the abuse of Muslim communities on the basis that they need to 
live by ‘British rules’, and a policy framework which routinely demands the same and 
suggests that this is not the case. A review of some of the policy statements that have 
dominated the UK in the last five years (see below) makes clear how many of these 
retrograde positions, far from emerging during the referendum debate, preceded it. 
They have for years been part of Britain’s political landscape and, as the Prime 
Minister has made clear, are now going to intensify in the post-referendum context. 
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The interpretation of racial violence 
Smug political elites are disconnected from the problems of ordinary people struggling 
under the impact of market forces. And much post-referendum analysis has correctly 
interpreted the Leave vote as a protest vote against this, not just against immigration. But, 
ironically, when it comes to post-referendum hate crimes, the same analysts and media 
commentators shy away from any political analysis, and show scant awareness of the long 
history of racist violence in the UK. Liberals from the ‘Remain camp’, in particular, have 
clung to the belief that racist hate crimes are simply a by-product of Brexit, whilst 
Conservatives in the ‘Leave camp’ argue that racism is down to a minority who have 
misunderstood the legitimate demand to ‘take back control’ – a view reinforced by 
the Daily Mail and the Sun which both supported the Leave campaign. Either way, racism 
is represented as a failing located within a thuggish minority, to be punished and dealt 
with solely under the rubric of law and order. 
Within each narrative, it was accepted, in the immediate aftermath of the referendum at 
least, that there had been a surge in violence and that the most important thing was to deal 
with it quickly in order to preserve social cohesion and the social order. It was the 
increased level of media reporting in those initial days that framed such an 
acknowledgement. A closer examination of the stories reported, however, reveals the very 
narrow lens through which the media looks, which, in turn, reproduces very limited 
understandings about racism. 
According to our data, the numerical upsurge is clear. There were almost seven times 
more racist incidents reported on by the media in the month after the referendum (134) 
than in the same month in 2015 (21). A statistic that whilst reflecting an increase in 
incidents of racist violence, on the one hand, indicates a heightened interest in racial 
violence, on the other. But what this increased reporting of racial violence also reflects is 
the way in which the relationships between the media, the criminal justice system and 
political authorities were shaping notions of how post-referendum racism was to be 
understood. 
Relying on the police for the story 
Following the referendum result, the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) requested 
weekly ‘returns’ on reported hate from police forces. Eight weeks later, it decided to stop 
publicising the weekly returns, effectively sending out a signal that the ‘surge’ or ‘spike’ 
was now subsiding.14Figure 1 shows the proportion of hate crimes reported to the NPCC 
in the week before, and the eight weeks after the referendum (when ‘returns’ were no 
longer obligatory) compared to the corresponding weeks in 2015. It also presents data 
from media-reported incidents on our database. And as it suggests, the media reporting of 
racial violence increased, initially, at a much higher rate before, eventually, falling 
roughly in line with police statistics. 
 
Figure 1. Percentage change in police-reported hate crimes. 
Why is this significant? One reason is that it suggests that the media defers to the police 
when deciding when racial violence is newsworthy. In the month after the referendum, of 
the 134 incidents that we collated, sixty-one (47 per cent) appeared to originate from the 
police, either from press releases appealing for information about an incident, or from 
otherwise police-initiated stories. This does not include a further 16 per cent of stories 
which appeared to originate from other criminal agencies and representatives. Or, in other 
words, following the referendum the criminal justice system was a dominant source of 
information on racist violence and which examples of racist attacks to highlight. 
Through the Freedom of Information Act we obtained data on the number of racist 
incidents recorded by each police force in the month after the referendum. The total 
number of incidents recorded from the fifteen police forces that reported the highest 
numbers was 6,516.When compared to the media-reported incidents that we collated, this 
would indicate that police forces, on average, either released information publicly on, or 
the media reported on, around 2 per cent of this number. This is consistent with many 
other forms of interpersonal violence. But given the media’s apparent reliance on the 
police as ‘a source’, it does provide one indication of the extent to which a level of 
selectivity exists as to which racist attacks are brought to public attention, and in what 
context. Whilst the media focus on racial violence intensified, the number of incidents 
brought to public attention to frame this discussion were few. And one implication is that, 
from our sample at least, information appears to be released on those incidents where 
policing appears to reside at the centre of the solution to racist violence. 
‘Balance’ and the construction of consensus 
The criminal justice system does not just have a role in providing information as to which 
incidents of racist violence to look at – our sample indicates that the media invariably 
looks to the police, too, to interpret such violence. According to our data, there is a 
hierarchy of interpretation which, in practice, means that when the media seeks to give 
meaning to an incident it turns (respectively) to the police, other criminal justice agencies, 
political figures, ‘community representatives’ and only finally to the victims or victims’ 
families. 
The journalistic notion of ‘balance’ and ‘objectivity’ is central to this. For, according to 
our data, when stories originated from outside established sources of authority (from the 
public, for example), it was almost always left to the police, or some other accredited 
institution, to interpret them. (Conversely, this was less likely when a case originated from 
the criminal justice system itself, and its portrayal of events did not need to be ‘balanced’ 
by another.) Even when victims of racist violence were approached for comment about 
racist attacks, it was generally only in terms of the emotional impact that an attack had 
had. That is, they were approached only as ‘victims’. What appeared not to be encouraged 
was for people to draw on their experience and offer any analysis of why it happened, or 
what should be done. This, in the majority of cases, was the job for the criminal justice 
system or other spokespeople speaking from an acknowledged position of authority. Thus 
‘balance’ was maintained, consensus was constructed. 
There are a number of consequences to this police and elite-led framing of post-
referendum racial violence. 
 Policy solutions to racial violence are narrowed to its policing. ‘The media’, of 
course, is not monolithic. And there have been a number of detailed and enquiring 
media investigations into racial violence and living under siege.15 Further, there have 
been some intrepid journalists who have questioned policing following the 
referendum. But in the main, racial violence is understood as threatening the social 
order. It becomes a matter for crime-reporting, not for social analysis. The police are 
depicted as a ‘thin blue line’ defending the nation against chaos, and the solution, 
therefore, resides in more powers and more resources for the criminal justice system. 
This was reflected, for example, in the uncritical championing of the government’s 
hate crime strategy after the referendum. That the response to racism resides largely in 
the bolstering of the criminal justice system, a smattering of educational projects and 
dealing with under-reporting is accepted as commonsense. Racial violence becomes 
defined narrowly as a law-and-order issue, without even a nod to all the policies and 
the climate which provide for its gestation. 
The government’s updated hate crime plans – ‘Action against hate’ (2016) – has ‘five 
areas for the next steps for Government and community partners to take to tackle hate 
crime’: 
 ‘Preventing hate crime by dealing with the beliefs and attitudes that can lead to hate 
crime’; 
 ‘Responding to hate crime in our communities with the aim of reducing the number of 
hate crime incidents’; 
 ‘Increasing the reporting of hate crime’; 
 ‘Improving support for the victims of hate crime’; 
 ‘Building our understanding of hate crime’. 
 The dominant narrative of racist violence following the referendum consequently 
becomes one of individualised ‘hate’, divorced from any political context. At best 
the context is the language of the referendum itself. Racist violence was generally 
framed simply as part of a ‘spike’ following the referendum. This in turn portrayed 
racism as some kind of aberration in an otherwise tolerant country. According to the 
deputy commissioner of Scotland Yard Craig Mackey, for example, the referendum 
result had ‘unleashed something in people’.16 It was a sentiment echoed again and 
again by political figures and criminal justice representatives, and reproduced in the 
media. Without in any way downplaying the level of racist abuse and violence 
following the referendum, its roots have to be sought in the way that a much broader 
political context (including the policies and practices of successive governments) had 
been its pump primer. But unable or unwilling to acknowledge this, political figures 
have articulated racist violence as the domain of isolated ‘thugs’ or ‘yobs’. The 
implications of this are that racism becomes defined as something rooted in the 
actions of a few, often already marginalised, communities. In this framework, it is the 
responsibility of benevolent political figures and a neutral political process to 
intervene. 
 The media disassociates itself from the construction of popular racism. The role 
of the media is almost entirely removed from any discussion about the creation of a 
climate which can lead to racial violence. Some of the newspapers and media outlets 
highlighting examples of racist violence after the referendum, and condemning it the 
loudest, have in fact been part of concerted long-term campaigns against all manner of 
‘undeserving’ asylum seekers, migrants and BAME communities, not to speak of the 
demonising of ‘terrorist’ Muslims. Under the guise of having an ‘honest debate’ about 
race and immigration, they have regurgitated tropes of migrant threats/invaders, along 
with notions of a multicultural enemy within. 
Tabloids like the Daily Mail and the Sun, which have consistently spoken up for ‘the 
majority’ and attacked migrants and Muslims, sometimes with the most scaremongering 
of front pages, were amongst the first to embrace a law-and-order stance for dealing with 
the perpetrators of violence and hate. The Daily Mail, for instance, could be accused of 
double standards, for condemning the ‘hate-filled’ ‘racist thugs’ who set fire to a Polish 
family’s property, when it had carried headlines such as ‘Migrants: how many more can 
we take?’. Likewise the Sun, which had carried headlines such as ‘we’re stuffed’, a ‘tide 
of refugees’ is ‘filling Europe’, now condemns the ‘horrific abuse’ painted on a refugee 
family’s door. Leader writers at the Sun opined, ‘we are appalled at reports of racist abuse 
in the wake of last week’s EU vote and utterly condemn attempts to provoke division in 
our society’, concluding that, ‘Anyone caught inciting racial hatred must feel the full force 
of the law’. 
Conclusion 
The racial violence following the referendum, as this report shows, took its brief and even 
its slogans from the broader racist policies, practices and narratives peddled by previous 
Labour and Conservative-led governments. But these are assiduously ignored when it 
comes to providing the official explanation of and remedy for racial violence. Racial 
violence is, on the one hand, abstracted from the conditions that create and sustain it and 
re-interpreted as a baseless manifestation of immoral individualised hatred, which, in a 
democratic society, has to be loudly and publicly condemned. On the other hand, the 
threat to social cohesion that racism risks, is not, in the official narrative, to be met with 
social solutions, but through policing. That this narrative is continuously reproduced by 
political figures, establishment spokespeople and media outlets is no coincidence. It 
emerges from the echo-chamber in which they operate. 
 
Figure 2. Examples of strident headlines. 
If this report augurs anything it is the danger of what a nativist Brexit state will look like. 
‘Brexit means Brexit’ is already being translated for BAME and migrant communities into 
‘Brexit means racism’ – not just on the ground but also in the repressive proposals already 
emanating from politicians and government departments in October 2016. For example, 
pregnant women having to hand over proof of immigration status before giving birth in 
hospitals, a proposed targeted visa system for EU migrants, the Department of Education 
demanding to know the nationality of school pupils, the proposed calling in of ‘debts’ of 
foreigners who have used the NHS. A nation state, which is (in the globalised world of the 
twenty-first century) defined specifically to divide those who rightfully belong from those 
who do not, will by definition enshrine racism. The discourse we can expect in the run-up 
to the triggering of Article 50 could be even more pernicious than that of the referendum 
debate. The referendum may be over but the ‘vote’ as to what kind of multicultural society 
we remain is in the making. 
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